When foreign media criticize China, as they have done during the recent Xinjiang riots, one common retort from many Chinese commenters is that foreigners don’t understand the Chinese people and their culture and therefore are not qualified to criticize China. Of course, that’s a nonsensical, overly broad characterization. A number of foreign commentators and journalists have ample experience living in China and are well-qualified to comment on the country. However, this Wall Street Journal article by Dru Gladney that I came across today is a good example of the kind of foreign misinterpretation that gives the “you don’t understand China” argument some basis.

The article examines the ethnic diversity and tensions that exist within China, but not so much the well-publicized conflicts with Tibetans and Uighurs. Instead, it focuses on the divides within the Han nationality, which actually consists of various subgroups marked by differences — sometimes dramatic ones — in language, culture, and geography. The article talks about how it’s now hip to be “ethnic” in China and takes it as part of a body of evidence for resurgent ethnic pride that, the author conjectures, could lead to increased tensions and weaken China.

While the author does correctly identify many of the differences between various subgroups/ethnicities within the Han nationality, I feel like he misinterprets what those things are telling him. Some examples:

The supposedly homogenous Han speak eight mutually unintelligible languages (Mandarin, Wu, Yue, Xiang, Hakka, Gan, Southern Min and Northern Min). … Mandarin was imposed as the national language early in the 20th century and has become the lingua franca, but, like Swahili in Africa, it must often be learned in school and is rarely used in everyday life across much of China.

The author is correct that those languages are mutually unintelligible, but to declare mandarin as “rarely used in everyday life” is just flat out wrong. For one thing, many TV programs, including the news, are in mandarin, as are most public announcements. Mandarin is typically used in official, public situations, while the native dialect covers the rest. Additionally, the teaching of mandarin in schools is not subjugating the local dialect. In Guangzhou, for instance, it is not displacing Cantonese. Kids in Guangzhou aren’t growing up not knowing how to speak Cantonese anymore. Rather, people use both their native dialect and mandarin, just for different purposes.

With the dramatic economic explosion in South China, southerners and others have begun to assert cultural and political differences. Whereas comedians used to make fun of southern ways and accents, southerners (especially Shanghainese) now scorn northerners for their lack of sophistication and business acumen. As any Mandarin-speaking Beijing resident will tell you, bargaining for vegetables or cellular telephones in Guangzhou or Shanghai markets is becoming more difficult for them due to growing pride in the local languages: Non-native speakers always pay a higher price.

Actually, southerners have always mocked northerners for lack of sophistication and business acumen, and many other things. This is not tied to any economic explosion. They did it back when everybody was poor, and they are still doing it. And of course, the very terms “southerners” and “northerners” are rather murky categories. Ask someone in Shanghai, and they’ll put themselves among the “southerners”. Ask someone in Guangzhou, and pretty much anyone from north of Guangdong Province can be considered a northerner; they just have varying degrees of “northern-ness”. As for the bargaining thing, non-native speakers has always paid a higher price. It’s a time-honored practice called taking advantage of non-locals and has little to do with ethnic divide.

Interestingly, most of these southern groups traditionally regarded themselves not as Han but as Tang, descendants of the great Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.) and its southern bases. Most Chinatowns in North America, Europe and Southeast Asia are inhabited by descendants of Chinese immigrants from the mainly Tang areas of southern China. The next decade may see the resurgence of Tang nationalism in southern China in opposition to northern Han nationalism, especially as economic wealth in the south eclipses that of the north.

The mistake here is that for many Chinese, the terms “Tang Ren” (Tang people) and “Han Ren” (Han people) are almost interchangeable. There really is no such thing as Tang pride in the way that Americans think of black pride or Southern pride. And the fact is, Guangzhou was first annexed by the Han Dynasty back in the second century B.C., so it’s not like Han influences are a relatively new phenomenon. That Han nationalism isn’t just coming from the north. It’s coming from every corner where people of the Han nationality live.

Indeed, one might even say it has become popular to be ‘ethnic’ in today’s China. Mongolian hot pot, Muslim noodle and Korean barbecue restaurants proliferate in every city, while minority clothing, artistic motifs and cultural styles adorn Chinese private homes.

This statement sorely needs to be put into context. Flourishing right alongside those Chinese ethnic restaurants are Starbuckses, Pizza Huts, and even Dunkin’ Donuts. I think what we are looking at here is an influx of outside culture, spurred on by the consumerism that is a relatively new phenomenon in China. People have money now, so they want to try new things. Some of those new things are coming from ethnic minorities from other corners of China, while others are coming from overseas. From this perspective, a Mongolian hot pot restaurant is no more a sign of rising ethnic pride than any one of the thousands of KFC’s that are popping up all around China. Otherwise, we can conclude that New England pride must be on the rise in China since Dunkin’ Donuts is planning to open a bunch of new locations in the country.

What the overall gist of the article seems to miss is that while these subgroups all have distinct cultures, languages, and histories, they also share a very intense identification as Chinese, as Han people, as “descendants of the dragon”. Ask someone in Guangzhou what they are, and they will say Cantonese. Yet, ask them if they are Chinese or Han people, and they’ll tell you yes without hesitation. There isn’t really an idea that they can’t belong to both equally. We aren’t looking at the antebellum United States, where one’s sense of being a “Virginian” or “North Carolinian” was in conflict with one’s sense of being an “American”. We are looking at a situation where the people’s sense of regional/ethnic identity co-exists on equal terms as, or in a separate sphere from, their national identity. For the subgroups within the Han nationality, the two are not really in competition.

Related Thoughts

• As for the tensions between these subgroups and Beijing, what the author doesn’t seem to grasp is that the tensions exist because Beijing is where the central government is, not because it’s overrun with Mandarin Chinese. There’s a long history of a disconnect between the ordinary Chinese person and the government, whether it be the communist party or an emperor.
• The regional tensions that are arising between the more developed southern coastal regions and the less developed central and northern parts are tempered by the many other disconnects, such as the widening gap between urban and rural areas, that through all regions and ethnic subgroups. Furthermore, whatever regional/ethnic tensions there may be within the Han nationality, one undeniable, practical truth helps bind the subgroups together — they are better off as one giant country than a bunch of little ones. That’s why I don’t see any such tensions reaching a point that can do real damage to China.
• What’s the difference between a separatist movement, a revolution, and a secession? Which one would the Confederacy fall into? What about the American colonies when they fought the British?